微观经济理论(英文影印版)
[绝版]基本信息
- 作者: (美)马斯.科莱尔 等
- 丛书名: 新世纪高校经济学英文版教材
- 出版社:上海财经大学出版社
- ISBN:7810982869
- 上架时间:2005-7-15
- 出版日期:2005 年1月
- 开本:16
- 页码:981
- 版次:1-1
- 所属分类:
经济管理 > 教材 > 专业课 > 微观经济学
教材 > 经济管理教材 > 专业课 > 微观经济学
内容简介回到顶部↑
本书是最近十余年来欧美经济学界最具影响力的高级微观经济学教科书。原著(Microeconomic Theory)由牛津大学出版社出版以来,受到了经济学界的广泛关注和好评。全书系统全面地介绍了高级微观经济理论的各个方面,涉及的论题丰富、信息量大,是公认的微观经济理论的“圣经”;本书被国外几乎所有的一流大学采用,是经济学专业研究生的必读书籍。
本书逻辑脉络清晰、写作风格严谨、分析方法精湛,以空前的深度和广度阐述了微观经济学所有重要的论题,不仅对经典理论进行了充分论述,而且对最新理论也给予了深入的分析,并展示了一些前沿论题的研究现状和发展趋势。
本书内容包括个体决策、博弈论、市场均衡与市场失灵、一般均衡、福利经济学与激励等五大部分。本书的数学附录为读者提供了所需的基本数学知识。书中每一章都提供必要的详细参考文献,方便学生进一步学习及寻找研究课题;同时,各章配备的层次不同的练习题,非常有利于学生测试自己对各章内容的掌握程度。
本书作者安德鲁.马斯-科莱尔、迈克尔.D.温斯顿、杰里.R.格林三位教授长期在美国哈佛大学及其他世界名校从事研究生层面的微观经济学课程的教学工作,且在各自的研究领域多有建树。此书是他们多年教学和合作的成果。
本书逻辑脉络清晰、写作风格严谨、分析方法精湛,以空前的深度和广度阐述了微观经济学所有重要的论题,不仅对经典理论进行了充分论述,而且对最新理论也给予了深入的分析,并展示了一些前沿论题的研究现状和发展趋势。
本书内容包括个体决策、博弈论、市场均衡与市场失灵、一般均衡、福利经济学与激励等五大部分。本书的数学附录为读者提供了所需的基本数学知识。书中每一章都提供必要的详细参考文献,方便学生进一步学习及寻找研究课题;同时,各章配备的层次不同的练习题,非常有利于学生测试自己对各章内容的掌握程度。
本书作者安德鲁.马斯-科莱尔、迈克尔.D.温斯顿、杰里.R.格林三位教授长期在美国哈佛大学及其他世界名校从事研究生层面的微观经济学课程的教学工作,且在各自的研究领域多有建树。此书是他们多年教学和合作的成果。
目录回到顶部↑
序 1
第一篇 个体决策
第1章 偏好与选择 5
1.a 引言 5
1.b 偏好关系 6
1.c 选择准则 9
1.d 偏好关系与选择准则的联系 11
习题 15
第2章 消费者选择 17
2.a 引言 17
2.b 物品 17
2.c 消费集合 18
2.d 竞争性预算 20
2.e 需求函数与比较静态分析 23
2.f 显示偏好弱公理与需求规律 28
习题 36
第3章 经典需求理论 40
3.a 引言 40
3.b 偏好关系:基本性质 41
3.c 偏好与效用 46
第一篇 个体决策
第1章 偏好与选择 5
1.a 引言 5
1.b 偏好关系 6
1.c 选择准则 9
1.d 偏好关系与选择准则的联系 11
习题 15
第2章 消费者选择 17
2.a 引言 17
2.b 物品 17
2.c 消费集合 18
2.d 竞争性预算 20
2.e 需求函数与比较静态分析 23
2.f 显示偏好弱公理与需求规律 28
习题 36
第3章 经典需求理论 40
3.a 引言 40
3.b 偏好关系:基本性质 41
3.c 偏好与效用 46
前言回到顶部↑
Microeconomic Theory is intended to serve as the text for a first-year graduate course in microeconomic theory. The original sources for much of the book's material are the lecture notes that we have provided over the years to students in the first-year microeconomic theory course at Harvard. Starting from these notes, we have tried to produce a text that covers in an accessible yet rigorous way the full range of topics taught in a typical first-year course.
The nonlexicographic ordering of our names deserves some explanation. The project was first planned and begun by the three of us in the spring of 1990. However, in February 1992, after early versions of most of the book's chapters had been drafted, Jerry Green was selected to serve as Provost of Harvard University, a position that forced him to suspend his involvement in the project. From this point in time until the manuscript's completion in June 1994, Andreu Mas-Colell and Michael Whinston assumed full responsibility for the project. With the conclusion of Jerry Green's service as Provost, the original three-person team was reunited for the review of galley and page proofs during the winter of 1994/1995.
The Organization of the Book
Microeconomic theory as a discipline begins by considering the behavior of individual agents and builds from this foundation to a theory of aggregate economic outcomes. Microeconomic Theory (the book) follows exactly this outline. It is divided into five parts. Part I covers individual decision making. It opens with a general treatment of individual choice and proceeds to develop the classical theories of consumer and producer behavior. It also provides an introduction to the theory of individual choice under uncertainty. Part II covers game theory, the extension of the theory of individual decision making to situations in which several decision makers interact. Part III initiates the investigation of market equilibria. It begins with an introduction to competitive equilibrium and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the context of the Marshallian partial equilibrium model. It then explores the possibilities for market failures in the presence of externalities, market power, and asymmetric information. Part IV substantially extends our previous study of competitive markets to the general equilibrium context. The positive and normative aspects of the theory are examined in detail, as are extensions of the theory to equilibrium under uncertainty and over time. Part V studies welfare economics. It discusses the possibilities for aggregation of individual preferences into social preferences both with and without interpersonal utility comparisons, as well as the implementation of social choices in the presence of incomplete information about agents' preferences. A Mathematical Appendix provides an introduction to most of the more advanced mathematics used in the book (e.g., concave/convex functions, constrained optimization techniques, fixed point theorems, etc.) as well as references for further reading.
The Style of the Book
In choosing the content of Microeconomic Theory we have tried to err on the side of inclusion. Our aim has been to assure coverage of most topics that instructors in a first-year graduate microeconomic theory course might want to teach. An inevitable consequence of this choice is that the book covers more topics than any single first-year course can discuss adequately. (We certainly have never taught all of it in any one year.) Our hope is that the range of topics presented will allow instructors the freedom to emphasize those they find most important.
We have sought a style of presentation that is accessible, yet also rigorous. Wherever possible we give precise definitions and formal proofs of propositions. At the same time, we accompany this analysis with extensive verbal discussion as well as with numerous examples to illustrate key concepts. Where we have considered a proof or topic either too difficult or too peripheral we have put it into smaller type to allow students to skip over it easily in a first reading.
Each chapter offers many exercises, ranging from easy to hard [graded from A (easiest) to C (hardest)] to help students master the material. Some of these exercises also appear within the text of the chapters so that students can check their understanding along the way (almost all of these are level A exercises).
The mathematical prerequisites for use of the book are a basic knowledge of calculus, some familiarity with linear algebra (although the use of vectors and matrices is introduced gradually in Part I), and a grasp of the elementary aspects of probability. Students also will find helpful some familiarity with microeconomics at the level of an intermediate undergraduate course.
Teaching the Book
The material in this book may be taught in many different sequences. Typically we have taught Parts I-III in the Fall semester and Parts IV and V in the Spring (omitting some topics in each case). A very. natural alternative to this sequence (one used in a number of departments that we know of) might instead teach Parts I and IV in the Fall, and Parts II, III, and V in the Spring. The advantage of this alternative sequence is that the study of general equilibrium analysis more closely follows the study of individual behavior in competitive markets that is developed in Part I. The disadvantage, and the reason we have not used this sequence in our own course, is that this makes for a more abstract first semester; our students have seemed happy to have the change of pace offered by game theory, oligopoly, and asymmetric information after studying Part I.
The chapters have been written to be relatively self-contained. As a result, they can be shifted easily among the parts to accommodate many other course sequences. For example, we have often opted to teach game theory on an "as needed" basis,breaking it up into segments that are discussed right before they are used (e.g., Chapter 7, Chapter 8, and Sections 9.A-B before studying oligopoly, Sections 9.C-D before covering signaling). Some other possibilities include teaching the aggregation of preferences (Chapter 21) immediately after individual decision making and covering the principal-agent problem (Chapter 14), adverse selection, signaling, and screening (Chapter 13), and mechanism design (Chapter 23) together in a section of the course focusing on information economics.
In addition, even within each part, the sequence of topics can often be altered easily. For example, it has been common in many programs to teach the preference- based theory of consumer demand before teaching the revealed preference, or "choice-based," theory. Although we think there are good reasons to reverse this sequence as we have done in Part T=I, we have made sure that the material on demand can be covered in this more traditional way as well.
On Mathematical Notation
For the most part, our use of mathematical notation is standard. Perhaps the most important mathematical rule to keep straight regards matrix notation. Put simply, vectors are always treated mathematically as column vectors, even though they are often displayed within the written text as rows to conserve space. The transpose of the (column) vector x is denoted by x. When taking the inner product of two (column) vectors x and y, we write x?y; it has the same meaning as xy. This and other aspects of matrix notation are reviewed in greater detail in Section M.A of the
Mathematical Appendix.
To help highlight definitions and propositions we have chosen to display them in a different typeface than is used elsewhere in the text. One perhaps unfortunate consequence of this choice is that mathematical symbols sometimes appear slightly differently there than in the rest of the text. With this warning, we hope that no confusion will result.
Summation symbols (Σ) are displayed in various ways throughout the text. Sometimes they are written as (usually only in displayed equations), but often to conserve space they appear as ΣNn=1, and in the many cases in which no confusion exists about the upper and lower limit of the index in the summation, we typically write just Σn. A similar point applies to the product symbol Π.
Acknowledgments
Many people have contributed to the development of this book. Dilip Abreu, Doug Bernheim, David Card, Prajit Dutta, Steve Goldman, John Panzar, and David Pearce all (bravely) test-taught a very early version of the manuscript during the 1991-92 academic year. Their comments at that early stage were instrumental in the refinement of the book into its current style, and led to many other substantive improvements in the text. Our colleagues (and in some cases former students) Luis Corch6n, Simon Grant, Drew Fudenberg, Chiaki Hara, Sergiu Hart, Bengt Holmstrom, Eric Maskin, John Nachbar, Martin Osborne, Ben Polak, Ariel Rubinstein, and Martin Weitzman offered numerous helpful suggestions. The book would undoubtedly have been better still had we managed to incorporate all of their ideas.
The nonlexicographic ordering of our names deserves some explanation. The project was first planned and begun by the three of us in the spring of 1990. However, in February 1992, after early versions of most of the book's chapters had been drafted, Jerry Green was selected to serve as Provost of Harvard University, a position that forced him to suspend his involvement in the project. From this point in time until the manuscript's completion in June 1994, Andreu Mas-Colell and Michael Whinston assumed full responsibility for the project. With the conclusion of Jerry Green's service as Provost, the original three-person team was reunited for the review of galley and page proofs during the winter of 1994/1995.
The Organization of the Book
Microeconomic theory as a discipline begins by considering the behavior of individual agents and builds from this foundation to a theory of aggregate economic outcomes. Microeconomic Theory (the book) follows exactly this outline. It is divided into five parts. Part I covers individual decision making. It opens with a general treatment of individual choice and proceeds to develop the classical theories of consumer and producer behavior. It also provides an introduction to the theory of individual choice under uncertainty. Part II covers game theory, the extension of the theory of individual decision making to situations in which several decision makers interact. Part III initiates the investigation of market equilibria. It begins with an introduction to competitive equilibrium and the fundamental theorems of welfare economics in the context of the Marshallian partial equilibrium model. It then explores the possibilities for market failures in the presence of externalities, market power, and asymmetric information. Part IV substantially extends our previous study of competitive markets to the general equilibrium context. The positive and normative aspects of the theory are examined in detail, as are extensions of the theory to equilibrium under uncertainty and over time. Part V studies welfare economics. It discusses the possibilities for aggregation of individual preferences into social preferences both with and without interpersonal utility comparisons, as well as the implementation of social choices in the presence of incomplete information about agents' preferences. A Mathematical Appendix provides an introduction to most of the more advanced mathematics used in the book (e.g., concave/convex functions, constrained optimization techniques, fixed point theorems, etc.) as well as references for further reading.
The Style of the Book
In choosing the content of Microeconomic Theory we have tried to err on the side of inclusion. Our aim has been to assure coverage of most topics that instructors in a first-year graduate microeconomic theory course might want to teach. An inevitable consequence of this choice is that the book covers more topics than any single first-year course can discuss adequately. (We certainly have never taught all of it in any one year.) Our hope is that the range of topics presented will allow instructors the freedom to emphasize those they find most important.
We have sought a style of presentation that is accessible, yet also rigorous. Wherever possible we give precise definitions and formal proofs of propositions. At the same time, we accompany this analysis with extensive verbal discussion as well as with numerous examples to illustrate key concepts. Where we have considered a proof or topic either too difficult or too peripheral we have put it into smaller type to allow students to skip over it easily in a first reading.
Each chapter offers many exercises, ranging from easy to hard [graded from A (easiest) to C (hardest)] to help students master the material. Some of these exercises also appear within the text of the chapters so that students can check their understanding along the way (almost all of these are level A exercises).
The mathematical prerequisites for use of the book are a basic knowledge of calculus, some familiarity with linear algebra (although the use of vectors and matrices is introduced gradually in Part I), and a grasp of the elementary aspects of probability. Students also will find helpful some familiarity with microeconomics at the level of an intermediate undergraduate course.
Teaching the Book
The material in this book may be taught in many different sequences. Typically we have taught Parts I-III in the Fall semester and Parts IV and V in the Spring (omitting some topics in each case). A very. natural alternative to this sequence (one used in a number of departments that we know of) might instead teach Parts I and IV in the Fall, and Parts II, III, and V in the Spring. The advantage of this alternative sequence is that the study of general equilibrium analysis more closely follows the study of individual behavior in competitive markets that is developed in Part I. The disadvantage, and the reason we have not used this sequence in our own course, is that this makes for a more abstract first semester; our students have seemed happy to have the change of pace offered by game theory, oligopoly, and asymmetric information after studying Part I.
The chapters have been written to be relatively self-contained. As a result, they can be shifted easily among the parts to accommodate many other course sequences. For example, we have often opted to teach game theory on an "as needed" basis,breaking it up into segments that are discussed right before they are used (e.g., Chapter 7, Chapter 8, and Sections 9.A-B before studying oligopoly, Sections 9.C-D before covering signaling). Some other possibilities include teaching the aggregation of preferences (Chapter 21) immediately after individual decision making and covering the principal-agent problem (Chapter 14), adverse selection, signaling, and screening (Chapter 13), and mechanism design (Chapter 23) together in a section of the course focusing on information economics.
In addition, even within each part, the sequence of topics can often be altered easily. For example, it has been common in many programs to teach the preference- based theory of consumer demand before teaching the revealed preference, or "choice-based," theory. Although we think there are good reasons to reverse this sequence as we have done in Part T=I, we have made sure that the material on demand can be covered in this more traditional way as well.
On Mathematical Notation
For the most part, our use of mathematical notation is standard. Perhaps the most important mathematical rule to keep straight regards matrix notation. Put simply, vectors are always treated mathematically as column vectors, even though they are often displayed within the written text as rows to conserve space. The transpose of the (column) vector x is denoted by x. When taking the inner product of two (column) vectors x and y, we write x?y; it has the same meaning as xy. This and other aspects of matrix notation are reviewed in greater detail in Section M.A of the
Mathematical Appendix.
To help highlight definitions and propositions we have chosen to display them in a different typeface than is used elsewhere in the text. One perhaps unfortunate consequence of this choice is that mathematical symbols sometimes appear slightly differently there than in the rest of the text. With this warning, we hope that no confusion will result.
Summation symbols (Σ) are displayed in various ways throughout the text. Sometimes they are written as (usually only in displayed equations), but often to conserve space they appear as ΣNn=1, and in the many cases in which no confusion exists about the upper and lower limit of the index in the summation, we typically write just Σn. A similar point applies to the product symbol Π.
Acknowledgments
Many people have contributed to the development of this book. Dilip Abreu, Doug Bernheim, David Card, Prajit Dutta, Steve Goldman, John Panzar, and David Pearce all (bravely) test-taught a very early version of the manuscript during the 1991-92 academic year. Their comments at that early stage were instrumental in the refinement of the book into its current style, and led to many other substantive improvements in the text. Our colleagues (and in some cases former students) Luis Corch6n, Simon Grant, Drew Fudenberg, Chiaki Hara, Sergiu Hart, Bengt Holmstrom, Eric Maskin, John Nachbar, Martin Osborne, Ben Polak, Ariel Rubinstein, and Martin Weitzman offered numerous helpful suggestions. The book would undoubtedly have been better still had we managed to incorporate all of their ideas.














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